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Abstract 
This paper extends the literature on the profitability of technical analysis in three directions. 
First, we investigate the performance of complex trading rules based on moving averages 
computed over longer periods than those usually considered. Different trading rules are 
simulated on daily prices of the Standard & Poor’s 500 index and we find that trading rules 
are more profitable when signals are generated over long horizons. Second, we analyse 
whether financial leverage can improve the profitability of different strategies, which appears 
to be the case when leverage is achieved with debt. Third, we propose a new market timing 
test that assesses whether a trading strategy can generate signals corresponding to bull and 
bear markets. The results of this test show that complex rules produce high proportions of 
accurate signals. 
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Technical Analysis with a Long-Term Perspective: 
Trading Strategies and Market Timing Ability 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Technical analysis encompasses a wide range of forecasting methods. These techniques use 
past prices and trading volumes of stocks, currencies or commodities to predict their future 
price levels. They are based on the belief that the evolution of asset prices exhibit regularities, 
and can be classified into two broad categories: charting and technical trading systems. The 
first group attempts to identify patterns in charts of past prices. Such patterns are assumed to 
be recurrent, and the occurrence of a specific figure is supposed to give an indication 
regarding the future evolution of asset prices. The second group includes different 
quantitative rules that attempt to detect trends in prices. Among them, the moving average, 
hereafter referred to as MA, and the filter rule are most popular1. In practice, market 
participants commonly use these techniques. Different academic surveys document their 
widespread use, particularly in foreign exchange markets. For example, Gehrig and Menkhoff 
(2006) find that the use of technical analysis has increased in the nineties among currency 
traders in Europe. For equity markets, there is no systematic survey evidence on the use of 
these methods. However, numerous technical reports and commentaries in the financial press 
and media witness the acceptance of technical analysis by equity investors as well. 
 
Despite the widespread use of technical analysis in the marketplace, academics have usually 
been very sceptical regarding the usefulness of these forecasting methods. There are a number 
of reasons for this. First, these techniques are difficult to justify theoretically2 and are usually 
expressed in a vocabulary that is foreign to academics (see Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay 
(1997, p. 42–43) for an example). Moreover, since the choice of parameters necessary to 
implement the trading rule is subjective, it is difficult to refute the validity of these methods. 
                                                 
1 In this paper, a trading rule refers to the method that generates trading signals. A trading system consists of 
using more than one trading rule to produce trading signals. Strategies reflect the effective trading positions 
taken in the market.  
2 This is particularly the case for charting methods. Trend-discovering methods, such as MA, have certain 
theoretical justification. For instance, Neftci (1991) argues that technical analysis may contain valuable 
information if and only if prices follow a nonlinear process. He shows that MA rules can predict the price 
evolution beyond its linear forecast. More evidence that MA rules exploit nonlinearities is provided by Gençay 
(1996), Dewachter (2001), Dewachter and Lyrio (2005) and Dueker and Neely (2007). 
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Finally, another major problem for academics is the assumption that it is possible to predict 
future prices from past prices, which is the exact opposite of the (weak-form) efficient market 
hypothesis. Since market efficiency is of critical importance to financial economists, an 
abundant empirical literature testing the profitability of trading rules derived from technical 
analysis has emerged (for an overview, see Irwin and Park (2007)). Most early studies have 
investigated simple technical trading rules, such as MA and filter rules, because of their ease 
of implementation. On the other hand, charting methods have received less attention because 
patterns have to be identified by subjective visual inspection and are difficult to detect 
systematically. This early literature has concluded that simple technical trading rules are not 
able to generate abnormal returns; therefore, there is little value in technical analysis. These 
initial results reinforced the doubts expressed by academics about the usefulness of these 
methods.  
 
However, a prominent article by Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron (1992) (BLL, hereafter) has 
renewed the interest in technical analysis. They simulate the returns obtained from 26 trading 
rules (MA and trading range breaks) applied to a century of daily prices of the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average Index. For these two rules, they consider a set of parameters that ranges 
from 1 to 200 days. They also point out that these rules are most popular in practice. They 
find that a majority of these rules generate significantly higher average returns than a buy-
and-hold strategy. The results of BLL have been challenged on the ground that such profits 
are difficult to achieve for investors3. Indeed, Bessembinder and Chan (1998) notice that the 
results of BLL ignore transaction costs, although these strategies imply some frequent trading. 
They replicate the simulations of BLL by considering trading costs explicitly, and find that 
the profitability disappears. This is in close agreement with Hudson, Dempsey and Keasey 
(1996) and Allen and Karjalainen (1999). Another issue related to testing the profitability of 
any investment strategy is the so-called data-snooping bias. This problem arises because 
researchers investigating the same datasets and trading rules may very well end up finding a 
few profitable rules by chance. These rules can lose their apparent predictive power when 
tested on another sample. White (2000) proposes a procedure that allows researchers to 
control for the data-snooping bias. It tests the statistical significance of the performance of a 
set of investment strategies by taking into account the effect of the data-snooping bias. It is 
                                                 
3 As pointed out by Malkiel (2003), an anomaly must generate a profitable investment in a real trading setting to 
be considered as a proof of market inefficiency. This is not the case for several anomalies documented by 
academic literature. 
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computed for the best-performing rule among a large universe of trading rules over a given 
period. Sullivan, Timmermann and White (1999) apply this test to the same set of rules and 
sample examined by BLL, and they find that the BLL results are not due to this bias; 
however, data-snooping is an issue on the subsequent 10 years sample and thus the 
profitability disappears. This loss of profitability in recent times is in line with the results 
found by LeBaron (2000) and Kidd and Brorsen (2004). The recent literature on the data-
snooping bias has improved the testing procedure of Sullivan, Timmermann and White (1999) 
since it appears too conservative and lacks power. Different alternative test statistics have 
been proposed recently by Hansen (2005), Romano and Wolf (2005) and Hsu, Hsu and Kuan 
(2010). 
 
One of the objectives of this paper is to investigate the profitability of a new set of MA rules. 
To mitigate the data-snooping bias, we examine complex trading systems introduced by 
Skouras (2001). He acknowledges that the choice of parameters to implement MA rules is 
subjective and shows that the performance of these rules is very sensitive to the choice of 
parameters. He compares the profitability of every single MA rule with a one-day short 
window and a long window ranging from two to 200 days. He finds that the best-performing 
rule yields a return 1270 times higher than the worst performing specification. Thus, he 
proposes an objective selection of the length of the MA using a recursive method. In the same 
spirit, Hsu and Kuan (2005) propose various algorithms to select or combine simple MA rules 
specifications to construct complex trading systems. They find that complex rules provide 
significantly higher returns than simple strategies. We follow their approach and propose 
slightly modified complex rules, which are described in Section 2. In addition, it is important 
to note that our procedure is not affected by the look-ahead bias, as the profitability of these 
strategies is assessed in an out-of-sample period. This out-of-sample approach corresponds to 
the one used in Lukac, Brorsen and Irwin (1988), Sullivan, Timmermann and White (1999), 
Skouras (2001) and Fong and Yong (2005). Complex rules also seem more realistic, since it is 
likely that technical analysts do not stick to a single rule when making trading decisions. 
Moreover, the use of complex rules allows the investor to take partial positions, i.e. to invest 
only a part of their capital. This is consistent with the approach of an investor willing to take 
into account the variable degree of signal accuracy generated by the trading system. 
  
The novelty of our approach lies in considering a wider range of parameters, particularly for 
the long MA. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to examine MA rule in a long-
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term setting, as we use horizons up to four years (990 days). All studies related to MA trading 
rules concentrate on relatively short-term trends in the market, as they consider a long MA of 
up to 200 days. However, the identification of short-term trends presents several 
disadvantages. First, the empirical academic literature on tests of weak-form market 
efficiency has documented a low level of short-term predictability (for a recent overview, see 
Lim and Brooks (2011)). In addition, even if a short-term trend is discovered, benefitting 
from it might be difficult. Indeed, the trend might already be over once it has been identified. 
A second disadvantage is that these trading strategies induce heavy trading activities. Thus, 
transaction costs dramatically reduce the profits from such strategies. On the other hand, 
allowing MA rules to generate signals over longer horizons might help detect long-term 
trends, which might be less noisy and more easily identifiable, as well as generate less trading 
activity. Since the existing market timing tests (for example, the test of Henriksson and 
Merton (1981)) are designed to detect short-term timing abilities, they are not suitable to 
assess the performance of a long-term strategy. Therefore, we propose a new market timing 
test. It determines whether a trading rule is able to generate positions that are consistent with 
long-term market phases, i.e. bull and bear markets. 
 
The simulations are performed on daily closing prices of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 
index ranging from January 1990 to December 2008. The complex rules are constructed from 
an initial universe of simple MA rules including 1876 combinations of parameters. We find 
supportive evidence that our trading systems provide higher returns than the standard MA 
rules investigated in the literature. They also provide a better performance than the buy-and-
hold returns according to different metrics. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the results 
are particularly strong over the more recent periods investigated, whereas the majority of 
studies investigating these periods with standard lengths of MA report a decrease in 
profitability. We also find that the optimal length of the long MA appears to be frequently 
longer than the standard 200 days. This indicates that our complex trading rules exploit long-
term trends in the market to generate substantial profits. This is confirmed by the proposed 
market timing test, which shows that the trading positions strongly coincide with market 
phases. Moreover, since the number of transactions involved by these rules is low, these 
profits appear to be economically significant. Thus, the results from our complex MA 
strategies challenge the efficient market hypothesis. An explanation for these results could be 
that most market participants are focused on short-term movements and are unaware (or 
alternatively unable to take advantage) of long-term trends. 
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Another objective of this paper is to consider the use of leverage with strategies generated by 
MA complex rules. If these strategies have good predictive power, the use of leverage should 
increase their returns further. There are also two other reasons for considering the addition of 
leverage. First, technical trading is widely used by hedge funds, particularly by commodity 
trading advisors (CTA), as discussed by Fung and Hsieh (2001). As these funds are known to 
use leverage, investigating these strategies is relevant from a practical point of view. Second, 
even if strategies have good predictive power, they cannot produce a significant abnormal 
return in a market environment characterized by a strong upward trend, since they will 
achieve at best the same performance as the benchmark. We examine two ways to implement 
leverage: with debt and with options. The results of our simulations show that the strategies 
with debt leverage see their risk-adjusted results improve dramatically. On the other hand, the 
strategies using options do not provide a better performance. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the complex trading rules. 
Section 3 details the different results obtained with complex rules as well as the market timing 
test, while Section 4 describes the results of strategies with leverage. Section 5 presents the 
conclusion. 
 
2. Data and trading systems 
 
2.1. Data 
 
2.1.1. Equity prices and returns 
Different simulations are performed on the S&P 500 index. This price index measures the 
evolution of stock prices of 500 large, publicly-traded companies in the US. We use a series 
that includes all daily closing prices of the S&P 500 ranging from January 1990 to December 
2008. The index closing prices are obtained from TR Datastream. We use either index levels 
to compute MAs or simple daily returns to compute the profitability of these trading rules. 
The first four years of data are used as the initial estimation period and trading strategies are 
evaluated over the 1994–2008 interval, which contains 3761 daily observations. We choose 
this relatively short interval as earlier periods have been intensively analysed in the literature, 
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and several authors point out that technical trading profits are more difficult to find over 
recent periods than in the more distant past.  
 
2.1.2. Interest rates 
Two interest rates are considered in this paper. A lending rate is used to represent the return of 
the investment strategy when the signals generated by a trading strategy are neutral. A 
borrowing rate is used to represent the cost of the strategy using debt leverage. We use the 
one-month Euro dollar deposit rate as the lending rate and the US Bank prime loan rate as the 
borrowing rate. The borrowing interest rate yields on average 2.3% p.a. more than the lending 
rate. The two interest rates are also extracted from TR Datastream.  
 
2.1.3. Exchange-traded options 
The alternative to implement trading strategies with financial leverage is to use options. We 
use daily observations of exchange-traded S&P 500 options obtained from the Market Data 
Express Service of the Chicago Board of Option Exchange (CBOE). We first remove from 
the sample non-continuous options and those with prices that violate the arbitrage conditions 
significantly. The sample contains 11,464 different call and 11,377 put options corresponding 
to a total of 1,828,800 daily observations. Since a number of options are available every 
trading day, we have to select a single put and call option daily to implement different trading 
strategies. We use the following criteria. First, we identify options with a time to maturity 
between 25 and 90 days and a moneyness level between −5% and + 5%. Then, the option 
with the highest daily open interest is chosen. The use of a liquidity measure in the selection 
process should limit mispricing, which is more likely to happen when there is no trade for a 
while. Finally, this option is kept until its time to maturity reaches 10 days. Once the option is 
selected, we compute the simple returns since a log-transformation would give a negative 
infinity return for options that expire worthless. First, we compute closing prices with the last 
bid or last ask prices and with the last sale prices according to the methodology given by the 
CBOE4. The bid-ask spread is also included in options returns to have a realistic proxy. 
Consequently, the option return differs from day to day, whether or not a new position is 
generated by the trading strategy. It is given by 
                                                 
4 If the last sale price is between the last bid price and last ask price, the close is on the last sale price. If the last 
sale is less than or equal to the last bid, the option series is closed on the last bid. Similarly, if the last sale is 
greater than or equal to the last ask, the close is on the last ask. In the case where there is no last sale for an 
option series, the previous day’s close is considered as the last sale and the same rules are applied.  
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where OC,t, OB,t and OA,t are, respectively, the closing, bid and ask option price at time t, and St 
is the trading signal. The first equation is used when there is no change in the trading position; 
hence, closing prices are used. The second one corresponds to the initiation of a new position 
that lasts for at least two days. The option is bought at the bid price at time t and the closing 
price is used at time t + 1 as there is no trade. The next equation enables us to compute 
returns for the last day of a position, and the ask price is used when the option is sold. The 
return of a position, which is kept for only one day, is calculated using the last equation. We 
apply the same method when the trading signal does not change but the selected option does 
change.  
 
2.2. The trading systems 
Each trading system relies on simple MA rules based on two MA of past prices, one 
computed over a short interval and the other over a long interval. MA is used to smooth out 
the price series and detect underlying trends. A series is assumed to be in an upward 
(downward) trend when the short MA (SMA) is above (below) the long MA (LMA). 
Sometimes, a band is also added to avoid non-informative or mixed signals when the 
difference between the two MA is small. Hence the rules are defined only by three 
parameters, which have to be chosen by the analyst; the length of the short and the long MA, 
S and L, respectively, and the bandwidth, B. The two MA, SMA and LMA, are computed as 
 
1 1
1 1  and   
S L
t t S j t t L j
j j
SMA p LMA p
S L    
   , (2) 
where p is the asset price and their relative difference  is  
 t tt
t
SMA LMA
LMA
  . (3) 
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The investment strategy consists of taking a long (short) position in the asset at time t after a 
buy (sell) signal, i.e. t > 0 (t < 0)5. When a bandwidth is used, a buy signal is generated if  
> B and a sell signal is generated if  < –B. No signal is generated when the two MA are 
close to each other (–B ≤  ≤ B) and thus, the strategy invests in the risk-free rate. Positions 
are kept as long as there is no change in the signal. 
 
As this paper analyzes the ability of MA rules to detect long-term trends, we compute LMA 
on periods going up to four years. Our universe of simple MA rules includes 1876 
combinations of parameters: 23 (48) different lengths for the SMA (LMA) with values 
ranging from one (five) day to 100 (990) days. Finally, the different rules are simulated with 
and without a band of 1%6. 
 
However, in this paper, we focus on complex trading rules, which aggregate the information 
provided by simple rules described above in different ways. Such trading systems present two 
important advantages compared with simple rules: they use more information and eliminate 
subjectivity in the selection of parameters. Moreover, the results of our simulations should be 
less prone to data-mining problems, since all simulations are performed over two sample 
periods: a selection period and an evaluation period. In the first step, the optimal selection of 
simple rules is determined according to their performance in the selection period. The 
complex rule is then simulated and assessed over the evaluation period. This procedure limits 
the effect of the data-snooping bias because even if the in-sample performance is the result of 
this bias, there is no reason that the selected specification performs well during the evaluation 
period. Thus, we argue that if a complex system outperforms the benchmark, this is not the 
result of the data-snooping bias but of the rule’s true predictive power. We investigate four 
different ways to combine the information contained in simple MA rules. The trading systems 
we investigate are close to those proposed by Hsu and Kuan (2005). We describe them below. 
 
                                                 
5 We use this approach since a majority of results in the literature are obtained using this strategy. However, it 
implies that it is possible to buy (sell) the asset at the closing price at time t to obtain the return in t + 1. 
Moreover, we have  simulated the returns to complex strategies assuming that the position is taken at the closing 
price at time t + 1 and considered the return at time t + 2. The results are very close to those obtained using the 
standard approach. Nonetheless, despite the fact that the signal and the position are simultaneous, this approach 
is free from any look-ahead bias.  
6 We consider lengths of the SMA from one to 10 days with an incremental step of two days, and then from 15 to 
100 days with a step of five days. The lengths of the LMA are from 5 to 50 days with an incremental step of five 
days and then from 65 to 990 days with a step of 25 days. As the length of LMA has to be larger than that of the 
SMA, we have 938 different MA rules. Since we also investigate rules with a 1% band, our universe of simple 
rules includes 938 x 2 = 1876 different rules. 
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OPT-ALL. The first rule is a continuous recursive process. Each day, the cumulative return 
of the 1876 simple rules is computed over the entire history of prices beginning from 1990. 
The rule with the highest return is selected to generate the actual trading signal. The first four 
years of data are used as the initial selection period and thus the strategy takes its first position 
on the first trading day in 1994. The procedure is then repeated every day by adding a day to 
the selection period. For the last trading day, the selection period used to determine the best 
performing rule is the period 1990–2008.  
 
For the three other complex rules, the length of each of the selection and evaluation periods is 
generally set to four years to match the maximal length of the LMA. We have four different 
sets of selection and evaluation periods7. For each trading system, we compute the strategy 
returns over the period January 1994 to December 2008 and compare its performance with 
different benchmarks over this period. 
 
OPT-4. This rule is fairly similar to the first one. It is a learning process in that it compares 
past individual MA rule’s performance to choose a specific set of parameters. However, 
instead of computing cumulated returns over the entire history, this rule compares the returns 
of simple MA rules only over the selection period. In addition, the parameters are not revised 
every day but the parameters of the selected rule are used over the entire evaluation period. 
Although the OPT-ALL rule takes into account more information and is very flexible, it 
might suffer from over-specification. Indeed, changes in parameters should only arise from 
changes in trends, which are not likely to occur frequently in the long-term.  
 
The two other trading systems aggregate information in a different way. They do not use the 
past rule’s performance to select a single simple set of parameters to generate trading signals, 
but combine signals from several simple MA rules. The first step is to identify all rules that 
have a cumulated return higher than or equal to the market in the selection period. This is 
where our systems differ from those in Hsu and Kuan (2005). This first step aims to eliminate 
non-performing simple MA rules and thus mitigate the influence of the choice of the initial 
specifications universe. Then, all these rules are used over the next evaluation period to 
                                                 
7 Our simulations are performed over four sets of selection (SP) and evaluation periods (EP). The exact dates of 
the different sets are: Set 1: Jan. 1990–Jan. 1994 (SP), Jan. 1994–Dec. 1997 (EP); Set 2: Jan. 1994–Dec. 1997 
(SP), Dec. 1997–Jan. 2002 (EP); Set 3: Dec. 1997–Jan. 2002 (SP), Jan. 2002–Jan. 2006 (EP); and Set 4: Jan. 
2002–Jan. 2006 (SP), Jan. 2006–Dec. 2008 (EP). To simulate the signals of the different simple rules over the 
initial SP, we use data on the S&P 500 index going back to January 1986. 
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generate the effective trading signals. These two rules differ by the way they use the 
information from simple rules.  
 
VOTE. This rule counts each trading day, the number of buy, neutral and sell signals 
generated by different rules identified in the selection period. The trading signal corresponds 
to the most frequent signal, which has received the highest number of ‘votes’. For example, 
suppose that we identify 825 MA rules with returns that are higher than or equal to the market 
during the selection period. For the first day of the evaluation period, we compute the trading 
signals generated by these 825 rules. Assuming that there are 500 buys and 325 sells, the rule 
takes a long position on the next day. This process is repeated each day during the four-year 
evaluation period with the same 825 rules. 
 
PARTIAL. This trading system averages the signals (−1 for sell, 0 for a neutral and 1 for a 
buy) generated by the selected rules and thus, produces a fractional position. According to the 
above-mentioned example, the PARTIAL rule generates a long position in the market 
corresponding to 21%, i.e. (500–325)/825, of the available capital on the next day. The 
invested amount varies according to the confidence in the forecast. Indeed, if there are only a 
few more rules that produce a buy signal than a short one, only a small percentage of the 
capital is invested. This partial investment approach for technical analysis is consistent with 
the findings of Blanchet-Scalliet, Diop, Gibson, Talay and Tanré (2007) and Zhu and Zhou 
(2009).  
 
Besides the buy-and-hold strategy, we also compare the profitability of complex rules with 
the returns of two other benchmark strategies. The first is the random walk strategy that takes 
a long position in t when the index return is positive in t and a short position otherwise. 
Finally, we also report the performance of the best-performing simple MA rule, named BEST, 
over the entire period from 1994 to 2008. The results for BEST cannot be used to assess 
whether technical trading has predictive power, because the choice of parameters is 
determined in-sample and is affected by the data-snooping bias. 
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3. The performance of complex trading strategies 
 
3.1. The performance of simple MA rules 
We first investigate the performance of simple MA rules over the entire sample period from 
1990–2008. Figure 1 presents the annualized mean simple returns of all the MA rules 
compared with the index buy-and-hold return. It shows that the standard set of MA rules 
investigated in the academic literature, which relies on short-term trends, performs poorly. 
Indeed, their mean returns are at best equal to the mean buy-and-hold return and even often 
negative. On the other hand, rules with an LMA length longer than the standard 200 days 
generate average returns up to more than two times the benchmark return. This may indicate 
that these trading rules are able to detect and exploit long-term trends. Furthermore, because 
transaction costs are ignored, the performance of the rules based on short-term trends would 
be overstated in a real trading setting as they change trading positions more often. It is also 
worth noting that the trading rule’s performance is rather insensitive to small variations in 
parameters. Even if we cannot test this formally, this may indicate that these results are 
probably not strongly affected by data-snooping bias.  
 
[Insert Figure 1: Simple MA rules returns] 
 
[Insert Figure 2: Simple MA rules returns on different subsamples] 
 
Figure 2 presents four subsamples without the 1% band. A number of interesting facts emerge 
from these results. First, the performance of the rules is consistent in all subsamples in the 
sense that the traditionally used specifications generate a poor performance. Second, these 
results contrast with the majority of recent studies that conclude that technical analysis 
performance has sharply decreased in recent times. We find that the performance of an 
extended set of MA rules specifications does not diminish over time. On the contrary, rules 
evaluated over the last two subsamples provide, in general, a much higher return than the buy-
and-hold strategy. Nevertheless, this figure shows that returns of rules relative to the buy-and-
hold depend strongly on the latter. When the benchmark performs extremely well, it is 
practically impossible to generate higher returns. On the other hand, during bear markets, 
many trading rules are able to generate economically significant abnormal returns. This is 
illustrated over the last subsample, which includes the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy-related 
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financial crisis. Whereas the buy-and-hold return is negative, most rules, except those based 
on very short MA, generate higher returns. However, since all the results are obtained in-
sample, there is a chance that they are affected by data-snooping bias. We now examine the 
performance of complex trading rules with the out-of-sample approach. 
 
3.2. The performance of complex trading rules 
Table I presents the performance analysis of the four trading systems presented in Section 2 
as well as the results for the three-benchmark strategies. We first examine the percentage of 
right signals. These measures are not directly related to the performance of the strategies, but 
they are useful to shed light on the trading rule’s forecasting ability. % Right Buy (Sell) is the 
percentage of buy (sell) positions followed by a positive (negative) buy-and-hold return on 
the next day. % Right Strategy is the total number of right signals over the total number of 
days, and is therefore a weighted combination of the two former statistics. For the PARTIAL 
rule, we consider a buy (sell) signal when the proportion invested in the index is greater 
(smaller) than zero. Thus, these statistics are similar for both PARTIAL and VOTING rules. 
The first five lines of Table I display the value of these statistics for different strategies. The 
results indicate that for buy positions, the four complex strategies have percentages slightly 
higher than the buy-and-hold, as they range from 54.2% to 54.7%, compared with 53.1% for 
the buy-and-hold. This latter value is higher than 50% because, in general, stock returns have 
a positive trend and there are more positive than negative returns. The percentages are lower 
for short positions; however, we argue that the forecasting ability is stronger on the short than 
the long side.  
 
[Insert Table I: Performance analysis of complex and benchmark strategies] 
 
Indeed, shorting the market continuously would result in only 46.88% of winning trades, 
while the percentages associated with the complex strategies lie between 50.53% and 51.74%. 
In addition, in absolute value, negative market returns are higher than positive returns.  
 
Turning to economic performance, we first observe that each complex strategy yields a higher 
simple mean return than the market. They range, in annual terms, from 10.70% for OPT-ALL 
to 14.61% for OPT-4, while the buy-and-hold yields only 6.16%. Whereas OPT-4’s 
performance is the highest among our four complex rules, those of the other three rules are 
rather close. This may result from the homogeneity of the simple MA rules returns, as shown 
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in Figures 1 and 2. Thus, the selection algorithms provide similar results. It is also interesting 
to note that the OPT-4 strategy generates a slightly higher return than the best in-sample 
simple MA rule, which yields 14.33%. This may indicate that the changing structure of the 
complex rule improves performance, as trends may change as well. The high percentages of 
right sell signals are reflected in the fact that each of the four complex rules has a rather large 
positive return on the sell side of the strategy. For two of them (VOTING and OPT-4), the 
mean sell return is even higher than their buy returns. The RW performs poorly, as indicated 
by a negative mean return. On the other hand, a contrarian strategy, which takes a long (short) 
position after a negative (positive) market return would yield a higher return than the market, 
i.e. a simple mean return of 8.54%. Nonetheless, each of our complex trading rules’ return is 
higher than the latter. In addition, this contrarian strategy trades very frequently with 3895 
transactions8 and thus its performance is not achievable in a real trading setting. 
 
Indeed, transaction costs are not included directly in the performance of the strategies. 
Nevertheless, complex strategies switch trading positions only between seven and 39 times 
over the entire 15 years of the evaluation period. Thus, the inclusion of realistic transaction 
costs would only diminish the overall performance marginally. The break-even transaction 
costs of our complex strategies range between 1.74% and 12.45%, while 0.1% is not 
uncommon for large investors today. 
 
Despite the promising economic performance of our complex rules, standard Student tests 
cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal means with the buy-and-hold returns. Indeed, the t-
statistics associated with the strategies’ returns lie between 0.65 and 1.20. This is far from the 
critical value associated with standard confidence levels. However, the standard test of 
equality in mean returns requires that the trading strategy generates a very high return to reject 
the null hypothesis of equality of means and therefore this test may not be well suited to 
identify truly outperforming strategies9.  
 
                                                 
8 This is higher than the number of days, as switching from a long to a short position implies two transactions.  
9 Let us define R as the difference between the mean returns of the trading strategy and that of the buy-and-
hold strategy, VR is the variance of the returns series and N is the number of observations. The standard test 
statistic is 2R VR N  . If we replace VR and N by the values of our sample (we have an annual volatility of 
19% and 15 years of data) and use a 5% confidence level, the R required to reject the null hypothesis is 13.77% 
p.a. This implies that with an average buy-and-hold return of 6.16%, all tests based on strategies with an annual 
average return lower than 20% would fail. With shorter intervals, an even higher return of the strategy would be 
required to reject the null hypothesis.  
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[Insert Figure 3: Complex rules compounded returns] 
 
To further illustrate the contrast between the economic and the statistical performance, Figure 
3 presents the cumulated compounded returns of the complex strategies, which are relevant 
from an investor point of view. They range between 274% for OPT-ALL and 572% for OPT-
4, compared with only 90% for the buy-and-hold. The corresponding mean annual 
compounded returns are 9.25% for OPT-ALL and 13.62% for OPT-4, while it is only 4.41% 
for the buy-and-hold.  
 
Finally, we examine whether the excess returns may compensate for higher risk bearing. 
Jensen’s alphas provide strong evidence against this hypothesis, as the alphas are even larger 
than the differences between the strategies and the buy-and-hold returns. For instance, the 
annualized average return of our four complex rules in excess of the buy-and-hold is 6.05%, 
while their annualized average alpha is 9.87%. This can be explained by the fact that the 
strategies’ betas are very close to zero, and as the buy-and-hold return is higher than the risk-
free rate, the alphas are higher than the difference in means. In addition, the alphas t-statistics 
are sharply higher than those associated with the differences in mean returns. The alpha 
associated with OPT-4 is even statistically different from zero at the 5% confidence level, and 
those of VOTING and PARTIAL are significant at the 10% level. These findings are 
confirmed by the Sharpe Ratios, which are at least twice as high as those of the buy-and-hold 
returns. This is not surprising as the volatilities of the complex strategies are similar to that of 
the market.  
 
The results obtained so far show that complex strategies are able to generate economically 
significant returns, but they do not give any indication regarding the parameters used to 
compute the trading signals. We analyze the characteristics of the OPT-ALL and OPT-4 rules. 
It appears that the LMA lengths of the OPT-ALL rule are highly concentrated around three 
values: 615, 665 and 940 days. They represent 99% of the distribution. In addition, the 
shortest LMA is equal to 340 days, which is still sensibly higher than the longest parameter 
usually considered in the literature. These results are in close agreement with the OPT-4 rule, 
which takes only four different parameters, as the LMA lengths are 665, 515, 415 and 240 
days. Moreover, the best performing rule in-sample (BEST) has an LMA (SMA) length of 
465 (60) days. These results indicate that complex trading rules are based on LMA lengths 
longer than those usually considered in the literature.  
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Table II provides some insights about the performance of the selection process and the 
parameters of the OPT-4 rule, which contains four evaluation periods. Thus, for each of them, 
we compare the performance of the selected rule with the average of all other rules. We 
compute the percentage of simple MA rules that have a higher or lower mean return than the 
OPT-4 strategy. These statistics are reported in the third and fourth line of Table II.  
 
[Insert Table II: Out-of-sample performance of the OPT-4 strategy] 
 
We find that the selected rule has a higher return than the average of MA rules in the initial 
universe over each of the four subsamples. Although the out-of-sample performance of the 
selected rule is the not the best among all specifications, only a small fraction of rules is able 
to generate higher returns, while the vast majority of rules have lower returns. The two 
statistics do not add up to 100% in the first subsample, because the market follows a strong 
upward trend over this period and thus many rules, like the selected one, consist of long 
positions only and generate identical returns. 
 
3.3. Market timing tests 
A number of market timing tests have been proposed in the literature. They usually examine 
whether the trading position is in line with the next period return, i.e. in case of market timing 
abilities, a long position should be taken when the return is positive. Nonetheless, we argue 
that such tests are not suitable to assess the market timing ability of strategies that follow 
long-term trends in the market. For instance, suppose that a bull market occurs, but there are 
45% of negative daily returns. If a trading rule is designed to invest according to the market 
phases and it is successful, it will generate a buy signal over the entire bull market phase. 
With the commonly used tests, this means that 45% of the trading signals are not right. Thus, 
we propose a test that assesses whether the strategy is able to generate positions that are 
consistent with the market phases instead of daily returns. 
 
The first step is to define the market phases or, in other words, bull and bear markets. 
Although visual inspection could be used, this approach would be subjective. Instead, we 
consider a variation of the algorithm proposed by Pagan and Sossounov (2003) designed to 
identify turning points in various cycles. A cycle is defined as two subsequent phases, a bull 
market following a bear market or the opposite. A central issue is to separate local peaks or 
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troughs from turning points in the cycle. Indeed, a short decrease (increase) in prices during a 
bull (bear) market should not indicate a change in the primary trend. This should be 
considered as a correction (rally) in a bull (bear) market. The algorithm proceeds as follows. 
First, it identifies the highest and lowest points over a 30-month window. The next step is to 
ensure that each market phase persists for at least nine months, or if this is not the case, the 
difference between the highest and lowest price should be greater than 25% in absolute value. 
The last stage of the algorithm warrants that a market cycle lasts for at least two years. Figure 
4 displays the phases identified by the algorithm for the S&P 500 in the evaluation period. 
 
[Insert Figure 4: Bull and bear markets] 
 
Once the bull and bear phases are identified, we analyse the trading signals generated by the 
complex and BEST trading rules. Four different statistics describing whether long (short) 
positions coincide with bull (bear) markets are computed. For each series, we compute the 
following statistics: the percentage of days during which strategies have long (short) positions 
during a bull (bear) market. We call these statistics % Buy-Bull and % Sell-Bear. We also 
compute the total percentage of right or wrong10 signals over the total number of days. We 
call these statistics % Right and % Wrong. Let us denote one of these statistics as V. To 
determine the significance of these statistics, we use a bootstrap methodology. The idea is to 
compare them with randomly generated trading signals. For each strategy, X random trading 
signal series are constructed according to a block bootstrap procedure to maintain, to some 
extent, the same structure as the original series. Then, the same statistic is computed for each 
of these X artificial series, V*, and they are ranked as V*1 < V*2<…< V*X.  
 * *( 1)m mV V V   . (4) 
We calculate the empirical p-value, P, as  
 1 /P M X  . (5) 
Intuitively, this p-value corresponds to the percentage of the simulated series that has a higher 
value than the original statistic. This test differs from the standard market timing test (e.g. 
Henriksson and Merton (1981)) by using market phases instead of market returns as turning 
                                                 
10 Here, right signals are defined as long (short) positions during a bull (bear) market. Wrong signals are defined 
as long (short) positions during a bear (bull) market. Right and wrong signals are independent of the sign of the 
market returns. 
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points. Therefore, the methodology we propose should not be used to detect short-term 
market timing (over a few trading days).  
 
[Insert Table III: Market timing tests for complex trading rules] 
 
Table III presents the results of the market timing tests. P-values are obtained with a block 
length of 40 days and 500 simulations (they are called ‘p-values 1’). They provide strong 
evidence that our complex rules exploit long-term trends in the market cycle to provide excess 
returns. Each complex rule is long during more than 90% of bull market days. The results are 
fairly weaker during the bear markets, but the percentages, between 61% and 74%, are much 
higher than what could be achieved by chance, as proved by p-values of 0. Furthermore, the 
total percentage of trading signals corresponding to the various market phases ranges between 
83% and 88%. This is higher than the 75% achieved by the buy-and-hold strategy. These 
results support the timing abilities of complex rules with respect to long-term market trends. 
One may argue that the aforementioned results are biased as the block length used in the 
bootstrap process does not correspond to the trends. Indeed, the complex rules keep their 
trading positions for much longer than our 40-day blocks. To verify the robustness of our 
results, we repeat the market timing tests with p-values computed with a block length of 470 
days and 1000 simulations. The results are presented in the rows ‘p-value 2’. As the new 
simulated series correspond more closely to the original series, the p-values associated with 
the first statistic rise. Nonetheless, the evidence supporting the presence of market timing 
abilities are not invalidated, as the p-values of the last two statistics, which describe the whole 
strategy (both long and short positions), remain significant.  
 
4. Strategies with leverage 
Since the results of the previous section show that complex strategies have real predictive 
power, an alternative approach to fully benefit from this feature is to implement these 
strategies with leverage. This could increase the profit potential, as leveraged returns are 
larger than simple long or short positions. There are also two other reasons for considering the 
combination of complex strategies with leverage. First, it is relevant from a practical point of 
view since some industry participants, such as CTAs, use technical trading and leverage. 
Second, even if a strategy has a high predictive power, it cannot produce a significant 
abnormal return in a market environment characterized by a strong upward trend. It will 
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achieve at best the same performance as the benchmark, as indicated in subsamples 1 and 2 of 
Figure 2. We examine two ways to implement leverage: with debt and with exchange-traded 
options. 
 
4.1. Leverage with debt 
We simulate the investment strategies with debt by calculating the returns with the following 
rules. After a buy signal, the investor borrows 100% of the capital and thus invests 200% of 
the capital. After a sell signal, the investor shorts 200% of the capital. We assume that the 
capital is sufficient to cover shorting requirements as collateral and therefore no cost is 
considered for short positions. The returns of the leveraged strategies are computed as 
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 (6) 
where Pt denotes the index price at time t, RB,t is the borrowing rate and RL,t is the lending 
rate. St represents the trading signal generated at time t and it takes 1 (–1) for a buy (sell) 
trading signal, the fractional trading signal for the PARTIAL strategy and 0 for a neutral 
signal. We do not include transactions costs in the computation of returns since our complex 
rules generate few trading signals, and trading costs have been shown to have a marginal 
impact on the profitability of our strategy in the previous section. However, we include 
borrowing costs since they are more likely to have an impact on profitability as they have to 
be paid after every buy signal. As different investors have different borrowing costs, we 
compute results with three different levels: a higher borrowing rate for retail investors, the 
lending rate that might be realistic for large investors and no borrowing costs that might proxy 
the profitability of investing with futures.  
 
Table IV shows the annualized mean returns of our complex trading strategies with the three 
levels of borrowing costs, as well as different risk-adjusted performance measures. It also 
includes the buy-and-hold performance obtained with leverage. The latter is analysed to 
document the effect on performance of the addition of leverage to a strategy with low levels 
of predictability. The use of leverage is expected to increase the volatility of the strategies. 
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This is confirmed in Table IV, where it appears that the buy-and-hold leveraged strategies 
have volatilities twice as high as those of the unleveraged strategies and they have betas equal 
to two. This higher volatility also induces a larger difference between the annualized mean 
simple and compounded return for all strategies when compared with the differences in the 
unleveraged case in Table I. Although the leveraged buy-and-hold strategy has higher mean 
simple returns than the unleveraged case, it has lower mean compounded returns except in the 
no borrowing costs case, where it is slightly higher. It appears that the simple addition of 
leverage to a strategy with low predictability does not help produce higher returns for an 
investor.  
 
[Insert Table IV: Complex rules returns: Leverage with debt] 
 
The results for the trading systems present a different picture. Indeed, even with high 
borrowing costs, the compounded average return is always higher with debt leverage than in 
the standard investment setting (OPT-ALL rule is an exception, where the average 
compounded is equal to the return of the unleveraged case). For the OPT-4 strategy, which 
has the highest predictive power, the difference is large. The annual mean compounded 
returns of this strategy are 19.1%, 21% and 24% according to the three levels of borrowing 
costs, while it is only 13.62% in the standard investment setting without leverage. This is the 
first evidence that adding leverage is valuable only if the trading rule has forecasting abilities. 
The second piece of evidence is provided by comparing the compounded returns of the 
strategies with their buy-and-hold counterparts. The complex strategies generate average 
yearly compounded returns ranging from 9.2% to 19.1% with the highest borrowing rate, 
while the buy-and-hold performance is equal to zero. When the risk-free rate is used as the 
borrowing cost, they generate annual mean compounded returns ranging from 5.5 times to 
10.6 times the leverage buy-and-hold. These relative differences are lower when no 
borrowing costs are considered, but they remain large (between 2.7 times and 4.7 times). 
These differences are due to the way returns are calculated with the borrowing costs. Indeed, 
as the buy-and-hold is always long, it has to bear the borrowing costs every day and therefore 
has a lower return when borrowing costs are taken into account. On the other hand, complex 
strategies have a significant amount of short positions during which no interest is paid. These 
results are a clear indication that the better performance of complex strategies is not due to 
leverage but rather to their timing abilities. This is confirmed with the high positive returns 
generated by the short side of the strategies. For instance, the OPT-4 rule produces a 
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substantial 35.8% annual simple mean return on the short side, which is higher than the long 
side with 27.2% without borrowing costs. 
 
Figure 5 displays these returns over the entire period for the three specifications of the OPT-4 
strategy and those of the buy-and-hold strategy. This graph illustrates the fact that the higher 
performance of leveraged strategies is not due to the sole use of leverage, but genuinely 
because of the forecasting power of the trading system. 
 
[Insert Figure 5: OPT-4 strategy compound returns with debt leverage] 
 
This is confirmed by analysing the alphas of complex strategies. Indeed, using leverage 
without forecasting power would only increase the beta and the normal return for bearing 
more market risk, but not the alpha. However, we observe that the alpha of the leverage buy-
and-hold without borrowing cost is positive and strongly significant. The alphas are derived 
from the static CAPM, which is expressed in terms of returns in excess of the risk-free rate. 
Thus, considering a zero borrowing cost implies an abnormal return equal to the risk-free rate. 
This coincides with the buy-and-hold alpha that is equal to the average risk-free rate over the 
evaluation period. The average annualized alpha for the four complex strategies without 
leverage is 9.4%, while it is between 1.83 and 2.2 times higher for the leveraged strategies. 
They are all higher than the 2.91% associated with the leverage buy-and-hold without 
borrowing costs. This indicates that risk is not the primary reason for these high abnormal 
returns. 
 
On the other hand, the Sharpe ratios of the leveraged strategies do not increase. They are very 
close to those obtained in the standard investment setting. Nevertheless, they consider the 
standard deviation as the risk measure and thus require a normal distribution. This is not the 
case when leverage is used11 and this issue is further investigated in Section 4.3. 
 
                                                 
11 The return of complex strategies using debt have an average skewness of −0.21 and an average kurtosis of 
13.40. 
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4.2. Leverage with exchange-traded options 
Exchange-traded options give the opportunity to take investment positions with leverage since 
the premium of the option represents only a fraction of the underlying stock price12. However, 
it is unlikely that an investor would use the signals generated by trading strategies to invest 
his entire capital in traded options because of the possibility of experiencing a return of –
100% and therefore losing the total value of his investment. For this reason, we simulate the 
returns of strategies that invest only a fraction of the capital in options. We consider three 
different proportions of options, namely 5%, 10% and 15%. For instance, a buy (sell) signal 
involves taking a long (short) position in the market equal to 95%, 90% or 85% of the 
available capital and buying call (put) options for the remaining amount.  
 
Table V reports the profitability of trading strategies that invest only a part of the capital in 
options. The returns of these strategies also appear to be very volatile, even if they are using 
options only partially. They range from an average annualized volatility of 40% for 5% 
invested in options to 90% for 15% invested in options, while the volatility of these strategies 
is around 19% for unleveraged strategies. The volatility of the returns for the OPT-4 strategy 
is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
[Insert Table V: Complex rules returns: Leverage with options] 
 
[Insert Figure 6: OPT-4 Strategy compound returns with option leverage] 
 
The impact of this high volatility is reflected in the large differences between means of simple 
and compounded returns. For instance, this difference for the OPT-ALL strategy is 7.41% in 
annual terms with 5% of options, and it reaches 35.7% with the highest proportion of options. 
As compounded returns reflect the effective performance obtained by these strategies, these 
high levels of volatility lower the returns earned by an investor. The inclusion of options in 
strategies affects the performance very differently. Indeed, the mean compounded return of 
the OPT-4 strategy increases from 13.5% annually to 19.2% when 15% of the capital is 
invested in options. On the other hand, the performance of the OPT-ALL strategy becomes 
negative with 15% invested in options. These results confirm that the addition of options is 
beneficial only when strategies have a high degree of predictive power. For other strategies, 
                                                 
12 Although options are a simple way to achieve leverage, we are aware of only two studies that have considered 
their use in this literature; Pruitt and White (1989) and Goodacre, Bosher and Dove (1999). 
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our results indicate that the increase in (simple) returns is not sufficient to compensate an 
investor for the large increase in volatility generated by options. We do not use Sharpe ratios 
to examine this trade-off, because the returns distributions depart clearly from normality13. 
We address this question explicitly in the next subsection, with risk measures that take into 
account higher moments of the distributions. 
 
Another issue with our simulations is that the selected options have an average maturity of 51 
days. This contrasts with the long-term perspective that characterizes the positions taken by 
the complex trading rules. However, it is impossible to define ex-ante the investment horizon 
objectively without being affected by the look-ahead bias. Indeed, the complex trading rule 
may suddenly begin to exploit short-term trends. In unreported robustness checks, we perform 
the same simulations with options that have, on an average, a time to maturity of 100 days. 
The results are similar to those presented here. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to compare the results obtained from the two techniques used to 
implement leverage, i.e. with debt or exchange-traded options. We find that debt is much 
more suitable than options to improve the performance of the complex trading rules. In 
particular, the increase in volatility is more limited with debt. While the two methods provide 
similar returns for the OPT-4 strategy, the volatility with debt is much lower, as it is 38% 
compared with 89%, with 15% of the capital invested in options. Another disadvantage of 
using options is that if the trading rule does not have a strong forecasting power, the effective 
profitability for an investor drops sharply. On the other hand, debt improves the performance 
for the four rules, and not only for the best-performing rule, the OPT-4. 
 
4.3 Alternative risk measures 
The risk measures used so far to examine the risk-adjusted performance rely on the 
assumption of return normality for the Sharpe ratio and on the CAPM framework for the 
alphas. Thus, they are not suitable for the leveraged strategies since their returns present 
different degrees of asymmetry. We examine other measures linked to the downside risk and 
                                                 
13 In unreported results, we computed the returns to strategies that invest 100% of the capital in options 
according to the strategy signals. The returns of these pure options strategies appear to depart strongly from 
normality, as their distributions are highly skewed (average skewness 4.89) and fat-tailed (average kurtosis 
64.35). Another problem related to the use of options is that there are days when the strategy signal is accurate 
(buy when the market rises or sell when the market drops) but the return on the option position is negative. This 
happens on 15% of the days and reduces the performance of the strategy. These ‘wrong’ option returns can be 
explained by the options’ loss of value due to the passage of time, mispricing and changes in volatility. The 
results of pure options strategies are available upon request. 
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the coskewness. Risk-averse investors require a premium for holding assets, which either 
varies more strongly with the market when the latter declines or when an asset decreases the 
skewness of the portfolio. This implies that assets with high downside betas and/or low 
coskewness should have a higher expected return. Ang, Chen and Xing (2006) find that these 
two risks are priced independently in the cross-sections of stock returns and they both bear a 
statistically and economically significant risk premium. For each strategy, we examine the 
downside and upside betas (β– and β+), the Sortino ratio, the unconditional coskewness (cosk) 
and the downside coskewness (cosk -). They are defined as 
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where R and RBH are the strategy and buy-and-hold returns, N is the number of observations 
and 1 is a dummy variable equal to one if the condition in brackets is fulfilled and zero 
otherwise. Table VI shows that standard strategies (without leverage) have negative downside 
and upside betas. However, the downside betas are larger than the upside in absolute value. 
This indicates that standard strategies have a negative exposure to the index but are able to 
generate higher returns during market downturns. For leverage with debt, the strategies have a 
similar behaviour except that the magnitude of the betas is two times that of standard 
strategies. For leverage with options, we observe the opposite, i.e. positive betas, with upside 
betas being much larger than their downside counterpart. In general, strategies with options 
tend to move in the same direction as the benchmark. There is one exception, the OPT-4 
strategy, which has a negative downside beta and is therefore able to take advantage of market 
downturns, which explains its positive performance even with options. Regarding the risk-
adjusted performance, the Sortino ratio analysis leads to the same conclusions that would 
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have been obtained with the Sharpe ratio. They confirm the superiority of the OPT-4 strategy 
as well as of complex strategies with respect to the buy-and-hold. Regarding the coskewness, 
it appears that strategies using debt have a negative coskewness while it is positive for 
strategies using options. This implies that strategies with options tend to amplify the skewness 
of the returns while strategies with debt tend to reduce the skewness of returns distributions. 
Moreover, leveraged strategies have positive downside coskewness. In addition, their value is 
higher than those of standard strategies. In this framework, leverage (especially with debt) 
increases returns and at the same time, reduces the risk associated with skewness. In short, 
combining our strategies with the buy-and-hold strategy would generate a portfolio with a 
higher skewness when returns are negative. Our strategies are therefore especially interesting 
for investors, as this ‘skewness insurance’ does not imply lower returns.  
 
[Insert Table VI: Alternative risk measures] 
 
5. Conclusion 
Although technical analysis is widely used in practice to forecast future price movements, its 
predictive power is challenged by the results of the academic literature that examines the 
profitability of technical trading strategies. This paper provides new evidence in this field and 
extends the literature in three directions. First, we examine trading systems based on MA 
rules that are not restricted to forecast short-term trends, as is usually done in the literature. 
Indeed, we consider a much wider range of parameters that might also exploit long-term 
trends. We use different complex trading strategies that combine simple MA rules with the 
aim of using more information and to mitigate the effect of the data-snooping bias. Second, 
we propose a new market timing test based on simulations to determine whether the new 
trading strategies tend to follow long-term trends in the market. Finally, we simulate the 
trading strategies with financial leverage because outperforming a market that follows a 
strong upward trend is difficult if the investor is only allowed to take long positions. We 
evaluate the performance of complex strategies combined with debt leverage and with 
exchange-traded options.  
 
We find that using complex trading strategies with a wider range of possible parameters leads 
to profitable results. Over our entire test period, from 1994 to 2008, they produce a 
compounded return ranging from 274% to 572% whereas the market yields only 90%. These 
25 
 
results are in sharp contrast with those found in the previous literature over the same period. It 
appears that the trading systems rely on rules with lengths of the LMA that are systematically 
higher than the 200 days investigated in other studies. The formal tests show that long and 
short positions coincide strongly with bull and bear market phases, to an extent that might not 
be reached by chance. The use of debt leverage increases the returns of the strategies 
substantially. Furthermore, when the buy-and-hold strategy is considered with the same 
leverage, its return does not increase. This indicates that the performance of trading strategies 
is the result of their forecasting abilities. However, the investor borrowing rate clearly 
influences the potential of using debt. On the other hand, exchange-traded options are subject 
to the loss of value due to the passage of time, mispricing and changes in volatility and, thus, 
provide mixed evidence. Moreover, the use of options generates highly volatile returns that 
reduce the returns of these strategies to the investor. Even the investment of a limited part of 
the available capital in options cannot eliminate this problem, except if the strategy possesses 
high forecasting power. Finally, we show that our strategies are especially interesting for an 
investor who considers the skewness risk.  
 
Overall, our results indicate that complex MA rules are able to detect and take advantage of 
long-term market movements and, in that sense, they are a challenge to the efficient market 
hypothesis. An explanation for these results could be that most market participants focus on 
short-term movements and are unaware of or unwilling to take advantage of long-term trends. 
Indeed, these strategies imply trading infrequently and following long-term market trends, 
while investors may require higher returns even in bull markets and may not be patient 
enough to wait for trend reversals. The above results raise at least two interesting research 
questions. First, a limitation of our results is related to statistical tests. We find that even if the 
abnormal returns are economically significant, they are not statistically significant. Indeed, 
standard tests based on Student t-statistics require returns that are at least three times higher 
than the buy-and-hold returns to reject the null hypothesis of equal means. This is difficult to 
achieve with standard market conditions. A more powerful and flexible test procedure 
integrating these facts could be developed. Another interesting extension would be to explore 
whether our results hold for a longer time span and in other markets. The answers to these 
questions are left for future research. 
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Figure 1: Simple MA rules returns 
 
 
 
Note: Each point on this graph represents the mean annualized returns of the simple MA rule with an SMA and 
an LMA equal to the respective value on the axes over the period 1994–2008. The vertical axis represents the 
mean annualized return of a strategy. The length of the SMA of the strategy is shown on the short MA axis and 
the length of the LMA of the strategy is shown on the long MA axis. The horizontal plane represents the 
annualized mean return of the buy-and-hold strategy.  
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Figure 2: Simple MA rules returns on different subsamples 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The points on these graphs represent the mean annualized returns of the different simple MA rules without band over different subperiods. The vertical axis represents 
the mean annualized return of a strategy, the length of the SMA of the strategy is shown on the short MA axis and the length of the LMA of the strategy is shown on the long 
MA axis. The horizontal planes represent the annualized mean return of the buy-and-hold strategy.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Complex rules compounded returns 
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Note: This figure presents the compounded return over the entire evaluation period for two benchmark 
strategies, the buy-and-hold strategy (BH) and the best in-sample strategy (BEST), as well as the four complex 
strategies described in Section 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Bull and bear markets 
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Note: This graph presents the trends identified as bull markets in blue and bear markets in red according to the 
Pagan and Sossounov (2003) procedure during the evaluation period 1994–2008 
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Figure 5: OPT-4 strategy compound returns with debt leverage 
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Note: This graph represents the compounded returns of different trading strategies with debt leverage over the 
evaluation period. BH, BH leverage loan and BH leverage no cost correspond respectively to the buy-and-hold 
strategy without leverage and with leverage when the US bank loan rate is used as the borrowing rate and when 
no borrowing cost is considered. The OPT-4 lines represent the compounded returns of the OPT-4 strategy with 
the three levels of borrowing costs. 
 
 
34 
 
Figure 6: OPT-4 strategy compound returns with option leverage 
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Note: This graph represents the compounded returns over the entire evaluation period of the OPT-4 strategy 
described in Section 2. The compounded returns are computed for different levels of capital invested in options. 
 
 
 
 
Table I: Performance analysis of complex and benchmark strategies  
  BH RW BEST OPT-ALL OPT-4 VOTING PARTIAL
        
Nb Buy 3761 1999 2893 2907 2872 2924 2924 
% Right Buy 0.531 0.513 0.546 0.542 0.547 0.544 0.544 
Nb Sell  1758 868 853 889 837 837 
% Right Sell  0.446 0.518 0.505 0.517 0.511 0.511 
% Right Strategy 0.531 0.482 0.540 0.534 0.540 0.537 0.537 
        
Buy  –0.022 0.133 0.110 0.136 0.117 0.116 
t-statistics  –1.03 1.05 0.70 1.09 0.80 0.80 
Sell  –0.158 0.177 0.097 0.179 0.131 0.113 
t-statistics  –2.41 0.90 0.28 0.92 0.54 0.40 
Strategy 0.062 –0.086 0.143 0.107 0.146 0.120 0.115 
t-statistics  –2.10 1.16 0.65 1.20 0.83 0.78 
Strategy Compounded 0.044 –0.099 0.133 0.093 0.136 0.107 0.103 
        
Nb Trades 1 3895 7 39 11 7 11.54 
Break Even TC  –0.001 0.174 0.017 0.115 0.125 0.069 
        
Volatility Buy  0.172 0.149 0.151 0.148 0.151 0.145 
Volatility Sell  0.212 0.293 0.291 0.292 0.293 0.279 
Volatility Strategy 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.183 
Beta 1.00 –0.15 –0.08 –0.04 –0.09 –0.03 –0.03 
t-statistics  –9.07 –4.68 –2.75 –5.74 –2.12 –1.92 
Alpha 0.000 –0.110 0.116 0.079 0.120 0.092 0.087 
t-statistics 0.00 –2.25 2.35 1.59 2.42 1.85 1.83 
Sharpe Ratio 0.168 –0.599 0.594 0.404 0.609 0.472 0.467 
                
Note: This table reports the results of three benchmark strategies: buy-and-hold (BH), random walk (RW) and 
best in-sample rule (BEST), as well as the four complex strategies over the entire evaluation period, from 
January 1994 to December 2008. All the strategies are described in Section 2. Nb Buy and Nb Sell are the 
number of long and short daily positions generated by the strategies, % Right corresponds to the percentage of 
right positions as described in Section 2. Buy and Sell are the annualized mean return of long and short 
positions, respectively, while Strategy is the mean return of the strategy. The t-statistics test the null hypothesis 
that the mean of the specific series is significantly different from the mean return of the buy-and-hold strategy. 
Strategy Compounded is the mean annualized return of the strategy in term of compounded returns. Nb Trades is 
the number of trades generated by the strategy. Break Even TC is the level of transaction costs that makes the 
excess return of the buy-and-hold strategy equal to zero. Volatility Buy, Sell and Strategy are respectively the 
annualized volatility of the long, short and overall positions. Beta and Alpha are estimated in the static CAPM 
framework. The t-statistics of the alpha and beta test the null hypothesis that these parameters are equal to 0. 
Alphas and Sharpe Ratio are expressed in annual terms. 
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Table II: Out-of-sample performance of the OPT-4 strategy 
  01.1994–12.1997 12.1997–01.2002 01.2002–01.2006 01.2006–12.2008 
Long MA 665 515 415 240 
Short MA 65 35 25 50 
Selected Rule 0.187 0.129 0.104 0.120 
Mean Others 0.156 0.068 0.051 0.074 
% High 0.001 0.089 0.027 0.026 
% Low 0.557 0.909 0.972 0.973 
Note: Long MA and Short MA are respectively the length of the LMA and SMA of the rule selected by the 
optimization process used by the OPT-4 strategy. Selected Rule is the out-of-sample mean annualized return of 
this strategy. Mean Others is the mean annualized return on an average across the whole set of trading rules 
considered. % High is the percentage of rules with a higher return than the selected rule and % Low is the 
percentage of rules with a lower return. 
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Table III: Market timing tests for complex trading rules 
  BEST OPT-ALL OPT-4 VOTING PARTIAL 
Nb Buy 2892 2906 2871 2923 2923 
Nb Sell 868 853 889 837 837 
% Buy-Bull 0.924 0.902 0.930 0.918 0.918 
p-value 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value 2 0.111 0.145 0.091 0.123 0.137 
% Sell-Bear 0.702 0.619 0.740 0.650 0.650 
p-value 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value 2 0.015 0.042 0.007 0.045 0.045 
% Right  0.869 0.832 0.883 0.852 0.852 
p-value 1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
p-value 2 0.000 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.001 
% Wrong  0.131 0.168 0.117 0.148 0.148 
p-value 1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
p-value 2 1.000 0.991 0.999 0.998 0.999 
Note: The first column refers to the best in-sample trading rule (BEST), while the other four rules are the trading 
rules described in Section 2. The figures in rows starting with a % and the p-values are computed as defined in 
Section 3.3. The p-values correspond to the percentage of simulated series which have a statistic higher than the 
original. ‘p-values 1’ are obtained with the length of the bootstrap equal to 40 days and with 500 simulations, 
while ‘p-values 2’ are obtained with a block bootstrap of 470 days and 1000 simulations. 
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Table IV: Complex rules returns: Leverage with debt  
Panel A: Borrowing rate = US Bank prime loan    
  BH OPT-ALL OPT-4 VOTING PARTIAL 
Buy 0.073 0.166 0.219 0.180 0.180 
Sell  0.195 0.358 0.262 0.226 
Strategy 0.073 0.162 0.249 0.197 0.187 
t-statistics  0.63 1.25 0.88 0.83 
Strategy Compounded 0.000 0.092 0.191 0.130 0.127 
Volatility Strategy 0.384 0.384 0.383 0.384 0.367 
Beta 2.00 −0.09 −0.19 −0.07 −0.06 
t-statistics 22418 −2.75 −5.73 −2.12 −1.92 
Alpha –0.020 0.136 0.226 0.169 0.160 
t-statistics –75 1.37 2.28 1.71 1.68 
Sharpe Ratio 0.115 0.346 0.573 0.436 0.430 
Panel B: Borrowing rate = risk free rate    
  BH OPT-ALL OPT-4 VOTING PARTIAL 
Buy 0.093 0.186 0.239 0.200 0.199 
Sell  0.195 0.358 0.262 0.226 
Strategy 0.093 0.178 0.264 0.212 0.202 
t-statistics  0.60 1.22 0.85 0.79 
Strategy Compounded 0.020 0.109 0.210 0.148 0.144 
Volatility Strategy 0.384 0.384 0.383 0.384 0.367 
Beta 2.00 –0.09 –0.19 –0.07 –0.06 
t-statistics 22727 –2.75 –5.73 –2.12 –1.92 
Alpha 0.000 0.151 0.241 0.185 0.175 
t-statistics 0.00 1.52 2.44 1.87 1.84 
Sharpe Ratio 0.167 0.387 0.613 0.477 0.471 
Panel C: No borrowing cost      
  BH OPT-ALL OPT-4 VOTING PARTIAL 
Buy 0.123 0.220 0.272 0.233 0.231 
Sell  0.195 0.358 0.262 0.226 
Strategy 0.123 0.203 0.289 0.238 0.227 
t-statistics  0.57 1.19 0.82 0.76 
Strategy Compounded 0.050 0.138 0.240 0.178 0.173 
Volatility Strategy 0.384 0.384 0.383 0.384 0.367 
Beta 2.00 –0.09 –0.19 –0.07 –0.06 
t-statistics 18242 –2.75 –5.72 –2.11 –1.92 
Alpha 0.029 0.177 0.266 0.211 0.200 
t-statistics 87 1.78 2.69 2.12 2.10 
Sharpe Ratio 0.244 0.454 0.678 0.544 0.539 
Note: This table reports the results of the leveraged buy-and-hold strategy (BH) as well as of the four complex 
strategies described in Section 2 over the entire evaluation period, from January 1994 to December 2008, according 
to the respective borrowing costs. All statistics are expressed in annual terms (except the beta). Buy, Sell and 
Strategy correspond respectively to the mean annual simple return of the long positions, sell positions and complete 
strategy. Strategy Compounded is the mean annual compounded strategy return and Volatility the annualized 
volatility. The t-statistics test the null hypothesis that the mean of the specific series is significantly different from 
the mean return of the buy-and-hold strategy. Beta and Alpha are estimated in the static CAPM framework. The t-
statistics of alpha and beta test the null hypothesis that these parameters are equal to 0.  
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Table V: Complex rules returns: Leverage with options 
Panel A: 5% of options     
  BH OPT-ALL OPT-4 VOTING PARTIAL 
Buy  0.187 0.245 0.196 0.202 
Sell  0.113 0.376 0.245 0.208 
Strategy 0.074 0.171 0.276 0.207 0.203 
Strategy Compounded –0.007 0.096 0.218 0.134 0.143 
      
Volatility Buy  0.379 0.368 0.380 0.360 
Volatility Sell  0.473 0.496 0.497 0.435 
Volatility Strategy 0.408 0.402 0.402 0.409 0.378 
      
Panel B: 10% of options     
  BH OPT-ALL OPT-4 VOTING PARTIAL 
Buy  0.265 0.354 0.275 0.288 
Sell  0.129 0.573 0.358 0.303 
Strategy 0.086 0.234 0.406 0.294 0.291 
Strategy Compounded –0.109 0.041 0.236 0.097 0.129 
      
Volatility Buy  0.635 0.616 0.636 0.601 
Volatility Sell  0.671 0.729 0.731 0.607 
Volatility Strategy 0.655 0.643 0.645 0.658 0.602 
      
Panel C: 15% of options     
  BH OPT-ALL OPT-4 VOTING PARTIAL 
Buy  0.342 0.463 0.354 0.374 
Sell  0.145 0.770 0.472 0.398 
Strategy 0.098 0.298 0.536 0.380 0.379 
Strategy Compounded –0.242 –0.059 0.192 0.007 0.066 
      
Volatility Buy  0.895 0.868 0.897 0.846 
Volatility Sell  0.874 0.970 0.974 0.783 
Volatility Strategy 0.909 0.890 0.893 0.914 0.832 
Note: This table presents the performance of the trading strategies with traded options over the entire evaluation 
period, from January 1994 to December 2008, according to the three levels of capital invested in options. All 
statistics are annualized. Buy, Sell and Strategy correspond respectively to the mean annual simple return of the long 
positions, sell positions and complete strategy. Strategy Compounded is the mean annual compounded strategy 
return. Volatility Buy, Sell and Strategy are respectively the annualized volatility of the long, short and overall 
positions.  
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Table VI: Alternative risk measures 
      β- β+ Sortino Cosk Cosk- 
U
nl
ev
er
ag
ed
 
st
ra
te
gi
es
 
St
an
da
rd
 
BH 1.00 1.00 0.310 –0.007 –0.250 
OPT-ALL –0.05 –0.04 0.543 –0.024 0.179 
OPT-4 –0.12 –0.06 0.608 –0.020 0.188 
VOTING –0.05 –0.02 0.745 –0.026 0.176 
PARTIAL –0.04 –0.02 0.612 –0.023 0.177 
Le
ve
ra
ge
 w
ith
 d
eb
t 
D
eb
t B
or
ro
w
in
g 
co
st
 
BH 2.00 2.00 0.186 –0.013 –0.499 
OPT-ALL –0.10 –0.08 0.413 –0.048 0.359 
OPT-4 –0.25 –0.12 0.500 –0.040 0.378 
VOTING –0.09 –0.05 0.638 –0.051 0.352 
PARTIAL –0.09 –0.03 0.500 –0.045 0.355 
       
D
eb
t R
F 
BH 2.00 2.00 0.236 −0.014 −0.499 
OPT-ALL −0.11 −0.07 0.453 −0.048 0.359 
OPT-4 −0.25 −0.12 0.540 −0.040 0.377 
VOTING −0.09 −0.04 0.677 −0.051 0.352 
PARTIAL −0.09 −0.03 0.540 −0.045 0.355 
       
D
eb
t n
o 
co
st
 BH 1.99 2.01 0.310 −0.014 −0.499 
OPT-ALL −0.11 −0.07 0.517 −0.048 0.359 
OPT-4 −0.25 −0.12 0.603 −0.041 0.377 
VOTING −0.10 −0.04 0.738 –0.052 0.352 
PARTIAL −0.09 −0.02 0.605 −0.046 0.355 
Le
ve
ra
ge
 w
ith
 o
pt
io
ns
 
O
pt
io
ns
 5
%
 BH 1.73 1.97 0.209 0.052 −0.321 
OPT-ALL 0.04 0.37 0.498 0.055 0.281 
OPT-4 −0.12 0.31 0.604 0.057 0.304 
VOTING 0.03 0.40 0.819 0.057 0.280 
PARTIAL 0.06 0.40 0.635 0.051 0.277 
       
O
pt
io
ns
 1
0%
 BH 2.45 2.95 0.162 0.111 −0.392 
OPT-ALL 0.14 0.78 0.459 0.134 0.382 
OPT-4 −0.11 0.68 0.576 0.135 0.419 
VOTING 0.12 0.82 0.812 0.140 0.384 
PARTIAL 0.17 0.81 0.615 0.125 0.376 
       
O
pt
io
ns
 1
5%
 BH 3.18 3.92 0.138 0.169 −0.464 
OPT-ALL 0.24 1.19 0.437 0.213 0.484 
OPT-4 −0.10 1.05 0.557 0.212 0.534 
VOTING 0.20 1.25 0.802 0.223 0.488 
PARTIAL 0.28 1.22 0.600 0.199 0.476 
Note: This table displays statistics presented in equations (7) – (11) for all complex strategies and the buy-and-hold 
strategy. The five first lines grouped under the Standard name correspond to strategies without financial leverage. 
The six subsequent groups refer to the debt leverage strategies according to the three levels of borrowing costs and 
to the strategies with options. Sortino Ratios are annualized. Values in the last two columns are multiplied by 
10,000.  
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Abstract
This paper extends the literature on the profitability of technical analysis in three directions. First, we 
investigate the performance of complex trading rules based on moving averages computed over longer 
periods than those usually considered. Different trading rules are simulated on daily prices of the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 index and we find that trading rules are more profitable when signals are 
generated over long horizons. Second, we analyse whether financial leverage can improve the 
profitability of different strategies, which appears to be the case when leverage is achieved with debt. 
Third, we propose a new market timing test that assesses whether a trading strategy can generate 
signals corresponding to bull and bear markets. The results of this test show that complex rules produce 
high proportions of accurate signals.
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